The role of electoral incentives for policy innovation: evidence from the U.S. welfare reform

We investigate whether the decision to experiment with novel policies is influenced by electoral incentives. Our empirical setting is the U.S. welfare reform in 1996, which marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. We find that electoral incentives matter: governors with st...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Bernecker, Andreas (VerfasserIn) , Boyer, Pierre C. (VerfasserIn) , Gathmann, Christina (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Munich CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute 2018
Ausgabe:This version: March 19, 2018
Schriftenreihe:CESifo working paper Category 1, Public finance no. 6964
In: CESifo working papers (no. 6964)

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Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/176983
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/docbase/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2018/wp-cesifo-2018-03/12012018006964.html
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp6964.pdf
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Andreas Bernecker, Pierre C. Boyer, Christina Gathmann
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We investigate whether the decision to experiment with novel policies is influenced by electoral incentives. Our empirical setting is the U.S. welfare reform in 1996, which marked the most dramatic shift in social policy since the New Deal. We find that electoral incentives matter: governors with strong electoral support are less likely to experiment with policies than governors with little electoral support. Yet, governors who cannot be reelected experiment more than governors striving for reelection. The importance of electoral incentives is robust to controlling for governor ideology, voter preferences for redistribution, the influence of the legislature, or for learning among states. A comparison of the role of governor ideology and electoral incentives reveals that both contribute about equally to policy experimentation.
Beschreibung:Online Resource