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Voting rules in multilateral bargaining: using an experiment to relax procedural assumptions

Experiments can be used to relax technical assumptions that are made by necessity in theoretical analysis, and further test the robustness of theoretical predictions. To illustrate this point we conduct a three-person bargaining experiment examining the effect of different decision rules (unanimity...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Tremewan, James (VerfasserIn) , Vanberg, Christoph (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Heidelberg University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics July 2018
Schriftenreihe:Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics no. 651
In: Discussion paper series (no. 651)

Schlagworte:
Graue Literatur
Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-251129
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/25112/1/Tremewan_Vanberg_2018_dp0651.pdf
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207627
Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-251129
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:James Tremewan and Christoph Vanberg

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