Buchumschlag

Buying votes and international organizations: the dirty work-hypothesis

Weitere Versionen anzeigen (1)

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Dreher, Axel (VerfasserIn) , Lang, Valentin (VerfasserIn) , Rosendorff, B. Peter (VerfasserIn) , Vreeland, James Raymond (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Munich CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute 2018
Schriftenreihe:CESifo working paper Category 2, Public choice no. 7329
In: CESifo working papers (no. 7329)

Schlagworte:
Graue Literatur
Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185527
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/docbase/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2018/wp-cesifo-2018-11/12012018007329.html
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7329.pdf
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Axel Dreher, Valentin F. Lang, B. Peter Rosendorff, James Raymond Vreeland
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more skeptical of a target country, favors are granted via international organizations. We test this theory empirically by examining how the United States uses bilateral aid and IMF loans to buy other countries’ votes in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Introducing new data on voting behavior in the UNSC over the 1960-2015 period, our results show that states allied with the US receive more bilateral aid when voting in line with the United States in the UNSC, while concurring votes of states less allied with the US are rewarded with loans from the IMF. Temporary UNSC members that vote against the United States do not receive such perks.
Beschreibung:Online Resource

Ähnliche Einträge