Buying votes and international organizations: the dirty work-hypothesis
We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are more...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Munich
CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute
2018
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| Series: | CESifo working paper Category 2, Public choice
no. 7329 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (no. 7329)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/185527 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/docbase/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-cesifo-2018/wp-cesifo-2018-11/12012018007329.html Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7329.pdf |
| Author Notes: | Axel Dreher, Valentin F. Lang, B. Peter Rosendorff, James Raymond Vreeland |
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Buying votes and international organizations: the dirty work-hypothesis
Book/Monograph
Working Paper