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Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

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When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and election...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Gersbach, Hans (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies 2001
Series:Working paper series / CESifo 406
In: CESifo working papers (406)

Subjects:
Arbeitspapier
Graue Literatur
Spieltheorie
Politische Entscheidung
Wahlverhalten
Asymmetrische Information
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Online Access: Get full text
Author Notes:Hans Gersbach

MARC

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