Competition of politicians for incentive contracts and elections

When politicians have lower discount factors than voters, democratic elections cannot sufficiently motivate politicians to undertake long-term socially beneficial projects. When politicians can offer incentive contracts which become effective upon reelection, the hierarchy of contracts and election...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Gersbach, Hans (Author)
Format:	Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies 2001
Series:	Working paper series / CESifo 406
In:	CESifo working papers (406)
Subjects:	Arbeitspapier Graue Literatur Spieltheorie Politische Entscheidung Wahlverhalten Asymmetrische Information Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
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Author Notes:	Hans Gersbach