Threatening thresholds?: The effect of disastrous regime shifts on the non-cooperative use of environmental goods and services
This paper presents a tractable dynamic game in which agents jointly use a resource. The resource replenishes fully but collapses irreversibly if the total use exceeds a threshold. The threshold is assumed to be constant, but its location may be unknown. Consequently, an experiment to increase the l...
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| Dokumenttyp: | Article (Journal) |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
31 January 2017
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| In: |
Journal of public economics
Year: 2017, Jahrgang: 147, Pages: 30-49 |
| ISSN: | 1879-2316 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.01.004 |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.01.004 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272717300130 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Florian K. Diekert |