Unbeatable imitation
We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule “imitate-if-better” can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a money pum...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Article (Journal) |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
September 2012
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| In: |
Games and economic behavior
Year: 2012, Jahrgang: 76, Heft: 1, Pages: 88-96 |
| ISSN: | 1090-2473 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.002 |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.002 Verlag, Volltext: https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825612000759 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper |
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