Buchumschlag

Cooling off in negotiations: does it work? [Dataset]

Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects rec...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Oechssler, Joerg (VerfasserIn) , Roider, Andreas (VerfasserIn) , Schmitz, Patrick W. (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Datenbank Forschungsdaten
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Heidelberg Universität 2018-11-02
DOI:10.11588/data/GPYRWB
Schlagworte:
Forschungsdaten
Datenbank
Online-Zugang:Verlag, Volltext: http://dx.doi.org/10.11588/data/GPYRWB
Verlag, Volltext: https://heidata.uni-heidelberg.de/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.11588/data/GPYRWB
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Jörg Oechssler, Andreas Roider, Patrick W. Schmitz
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Negotiations frequently end in conflict after one party rejects a final offer. In a large-scale Internet experiment, we investigate whether a 24-hour cooling-off period leads to fewer rejections in ultimatum bargaining. We conduct a standard cash treatment and a lottery treatment, where subjects receive lottery tickets for several large prizes. In the lottery treatment, unfair offers are less frequently rejected, and cooling off reduces the rejection rate further. In the cash treatment, rejections are more frequent and remain so after cooling off. We also study the effect of subjects' degree of “cognitive reflection” on their behavior.
Beschreibung:Deposit date 2018-10-30
Gesehen am 08.11.2018
Beschreibung:Online Resource
DOI:10.11588/data/GPYRWB

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