Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments
We study a legislative bargaining game in which failure to agree in a given round may result in a breakdown of negotiations. In that case, each player receives an exogenous ‘disagreement value’. We characterize the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibria under all q-majority rules. Under unanim...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2018
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| In: |
Games and economic behavior
Year: 2017, Volume: 107, Pages: 60-92 |
| ISSN: | 1090-2473 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.003 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.11.003 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825617301963 
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| Author Notes: | Luis Miller, Maria Montero, Christoph Vanberg |
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