Legislative bargaining with joint production: an experimental study
We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Heidelberg
Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg
October 2019
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| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper series / University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
no. 670 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 670)
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| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00027256 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-272560 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00027256 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/27256 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/207646 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Anna Merkel and Christoph Vanberg |
| Zusammenfassung: | We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we investigate how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced. |
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| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00027256 |