What is the epistemic function of fighly Iiealized agent-based models of scientific inquiry?

In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models (ABMs) of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific inquiry is unwarranted, at least for the class of models propo...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Frey, Daniel (Author) , Šešelja, Dunja (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: 16 April 2018
In: Philosophy of the social sciences
Year: 2018, Volume: 48, Issue: 4, Pages: 407-433
ISSN:1552-7441
DOI:10.1177/0048393118767085
Online Access:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1177/0048393118767085
Get full text
Author Notes:Daniel Frey and Dunja Šešelja
Description
Summary:In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models (ABMs) of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific inquiry is unwarranted, at least for the class of models proposed in recent literature. Moreover, we argue that a weaker approach, which takes these models as providing only “how-possibly” explanations, does not help to improve their epistemic value. On the other hand, we suggest that if ABMs of science underwent two types of robustness analysis, they could indeed have a clear epistemic function, namely by providing evidence for philosophical and historical hypotheses. In this sense, ABMs can obtain evidential and explanatory properties and thus be a useful tool for integrated history and philosophy of science. We illustrate our point with an example of a model—building on the work by Kevin Zollman—which we apply to a concrete historical case study.
Item Description:Gesehen am 28.04.2020
Physical Description:Online Resource
ISSN:1552-7441
DOI:10.1177/0048393118767085