Premium auctions and risk preferences: an experimental study

In premium auctions, the highest losing bidder receives a reward from the seller. This paper studies the private value English premium auction (EPA) for different risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derive the symmetric equilibrium for bidders with CARA utilities and conduct an experimental stu...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Brunner, Christoph (VerfasserIn) , Hu, Audrey Xianhua (VerfasserIn) , Oechssler, Joerg (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal)
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 9 July 2014
In: Games and economic behavior
Year: 2014, Jahrgang: 87, Pages: 467-484
ISSN:1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.002
Online-Zugang:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.002
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614001109
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Christoph Brunner, Audrey Hu, Jörg Oechssler

MARC

LEADER 00000caa a2200000 c 4500
001 1728865166
003 DE-627
005 20230405104352.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 200904s2014 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.002  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1728865166 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1728865166 
035 |a (OCoLC)1341358648 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 17  |2 sdnb 
100 1 |a Brunner, Christoph  |e VerfasserIn  |0 (DE-588)142132748  |0 (DE-627)633681180  |0 (DE-576)328053112  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Premium auctions and risk preferences  |b an experimental study  |c Christoph Brunner, Audrey Hu, Jörg Oechssler 
264 1 |c 9 July 2014 
300 |b Diagramme 
300 |a 18 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
500 |a Gesehen am 04.09.2020 
520 |a In premium auctions, the highest losing bidder receives a reward from the seller. This paper studies the private value English premium auction (EPA) for different risk attitudes of bidders. We explicitly derive the symmetric equilibrium for bidders with CARA utilities and conduct an experimental study to test the theoretical predictions. In our experiment, subjects are sorted into risk-averse and risk-loving groups. We find that revenues in the EPA are significantly higher when bidders are risk loving rather than risk averse. These results are partly consistent with theory and confirm the general view that bidders' risk preferences constitute an important factor that affects bidding behavior and consequently also the seller's expected revenue. However, individual subjects rarely follow the equilibrium strategy and revenue in our experiment is lower than in the symmetric equilibrium. 
650 4 |a Experimental economics 
650 4 |a Holt-Laury method 
650 4 |a Premium auction 
650 4 |a Risk preference 
700 1 |a Hu, Audrey Xianhua  |e VerfasserIn  |0 (DE-588)107359484X  |0 (DE-627)829194282  |0 (DE-576)435187260  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Oechssler, Joerg  |e VerfasserIn  |0 (DE-588)118045083  |0 (DE-627)509801927  |0 (DE-576)291684483  |4 aut 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Games and economic behavior  |d Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1989  |g 87(2014), Seite 467-484  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)266878547  |w (DE-600)1467668-0  |w (DE-576)104082119  |x 1090-2473  |7 nnas  |a Premium auctions and risk preferences an experimental study 
773 1 8 |g volume:87  |g year:2014  |g pages:467-484  |g extent:18  |a Premium auctions and risk preferences an experimental study 
776 0 8 |i Erscheint auch als  |n Druck-Ausgabe  |a Brunner, Christoph  |t Premium auctions and risk preferences  |d 2014  |w (DE-627)832945005  |w (DE-576)9832945003 
787 0 8 |i Forschungsdaten  |a Brunner, Christoph  |t Premium auctions and risk preferences  |d Heidelberg : Universität, 2023  |h 1 Online-Ressource (3 Files)  |w (DE-627)1841262242 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.002  |x Verlag  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
856 4 0 |u http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614001109  |x Verlag  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
951 |a AR 
992 |a 20200904 
993 |a Article 
994 |a 2014 
998 |g 118045083  |a Oechssler, Joerg  |m 118045083:Oechssler, Joerg  |d 180000  |d 181000  |e 180000PO118045083  |e 181000PO118045083  |k 0/180000/  |k 1/180000/181000/  |p 3  |y j 
998 |g 142132748  |a Brunner, Christoph  |m 142132748:Brunner, Christoph  |d 180000  |d 181000  |e 180000PB142132748  |e 181000PB142132748  |k 0/180000/  |k 1/180000/181000/  |p 1  |x j 
999 |a KXP-PPN1728865166  |e 3746521386 
BIB |a Y 
SER |a journal 
JSO |a {"person":[{"role":"aut","display":"Brunner, Christoph","roleDisplay":"VerfasserIn","given":"Christoph","family":"Brunner"},{"role":"aut","display":"Hu, Audrey Xianhua","roleDisplay":"VerfasserIn","given":"Audrey Xianhua","family":"Hu"},{"family":"Oechssler","given":"Joerg","roleDisplay":"VerfasserIn","display":"Oechssler, Joerg","role":"aut"}],"title":[{"subtitle":"an experimental study","title":"Premium auctions and risk preferences","title_sort":"Premium auctions and risk preferences"}],"language":["eng"],"recId":"1728865166","note":["Gesehen am 04.09.2020"],"type":{"bibl":"article-journal","media":"Online-Ressource"},"name":{"displayForm":["Christoph Brunner, Audrey Hu, Jörg Oechssler"]},"id":{"doi":["10.1016/j.geb.2014.06.002"],"eki":["1728865166"]},"origin":[{"dateIssuedKey":"2014","dateIssuedDisp":"9 July 2014"}],"relHost":[{"id":{"zdb":["1467668-0"],"eki":["266878547"],"issn":["1090-2473"]},"origin":[{"publisherPlace":"Amsterdam [u.a.] ; Orlando, Fla.","publisher":"Elsevier ; Academic Press","dateIssuedKey":"1989","dateIssuedDisp":"1989-"}],"physDesc":[{"extent":"Online-Ressource"}],"title":[{"title":"Games and economic behavior","title_sort":"Games and economic behavior"}],"part":{"pages":"467-484","year":"2014","extent":"18","text":"87(2014), Seite 467-484","volume":"87"},"pubHistory":["1.1989 -"],"language":["eng"],"recId":"266878547","type":{"media":"Online-Ressource","bibl":"periodical"},"note":["Gesehen am 19.10.07"],"disp":"Premium auctions and risk preferences an experimental studyGames and economic behavior"}],"physDesc":[{"noteIll":"Diagramme","extent":"18 S."}]} 
SRT |a BRUNNERCHRPREMIUMAUC9201