Persuasion with communication costs
This paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report. Contrary to previous literature, it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by Milgrom (1981) is relatively robust to costly reporting. A sepa...
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| Dokumenttyp: | Article (Journal) |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
22 May 2015
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| In: |
Games and economic behavior
Year: 2015, Jahrgang: 92, Pages: 28-40 |
| ISSN: | 1090-2473 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.004 |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.004 Verlag: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825615000780 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Jonas Hedlund |
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