Optimism and pessimism in games

This article considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the existing literature on games with ambiguity-averse players by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. We use the CEU model of ambiguity with a class of capacities introduced by Jaffrray and Philippe (Mathe...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Eichberger, Jürgen (Author) , Kelsey, David (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: 22 April 2014
In: International economic review
Year: 2014, Volume: 55, Issue: 2, Pages: 483-505
ISSN:1468-2354
DOI:10.1111/iere.12058
Online Access:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12058
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/iere.12058
Get full text
Author Notes:by Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey
Description
Summary:This article considers the impact of ambiguity in strategic situations. It extends the existing literature on games with ambiguity-averse players by allowing for optimistic responses to ambiguity. We use the CEU model of ambiguity with a class of capacities introduced by Jaffrray and Philippe (Mathematics of Operations Research 22 (1997), 165-85), which allows us to distinguish ambiguity from ambiguity-attitude, and propose a new solution concept, equilibrium under ambiguity (EUA), for players who may be characterized by ambiguity-preference. Applying EUA, we study comparative statics of changes in ambiguity-attitude in games with strategic complements. This extends work in Eichberger and Kelsey (Journal of Economic Theory 106 (2002), 436-66) on the effects of increasing ambiguity if players are ambiguity averse.
Item Description:Gesehen am 16.09.2020
Physical Description:Online Resource
ISSN:1468-2354
DOI:10.1111/iere.12058