Safety, sensitivity and “distant” epistemic luck
Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in or...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2014
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| In: |
Theoria
Year: 2014, Volume: 80, Issue: 1, Pages: 44-61 |
| ISSN: | 1755-2567 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/theo.12011 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12011 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/theo.12011 
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| Author Notes: | by Wolfgang Freitag |
| Summary: | Prominent instances of anti-luck epistemology, in particular sensitivity and safety accounts of knowledge, introduce a modal condition on the pertinent belief in terms of closeness or similarity of possible worlds. Very roughly speaking, a belief must continue to be true in close possibilities in order to qualify as knowledge. Such closeness-accounts derive much support from their (alleged) ability to eliminate standard instances of epistemic luck as they appear in prominent Gettier-type examples. The article argues that there are new Gettier-type examples which are grounded in “distant” epistemic luck. It is demonstrated that sensitivity and safety theories cannot handle such examples. |
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| Item Description: | First published: 03 April 2013 Gesehen am 27.09.2021 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1755-2567 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/theo.12011 |