Finitely repeated games with social preferences

A well-known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that this re...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author:	Oechssler, Joerg (Author)
Format:	Article (Journal)
Language:	English
Published:	2013
In:	Experimental economics Year: 2013, Volume: 16, Issue: 2, Pages: 222-231
ISSN:	1573-6938
DOI:	10.1007/s10683-012-9336-6
Online Access:	Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-012-9336-6
Author Notes:	Jörg Oechssler

Finitely repeated games with social preferences by Oechssler, Joerg (Author)

in: Experimental economics, 16 (2013), 2 vom: Juni, Seite 222-231

Article (Journal)

Finitely repeated games with social preferences by Oechssler, Joerg (Author)

in: Discussion paper series (no. 512)

Book/Monograph Working Paper Online Resource

Finitely repeated games with social preferences

Finitely repeated games with social preferences by Oechssler, Joerg (Author)

Finitely repeated games with social preferences by Oechssler, Joerg (Author)

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