Legislative bargaining with private information: a comparison of majority and unanimity rule

We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known "breakdown values" which determine their payoff in case of "break...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Piazolo, David (Author) , Vanberg, Christoph (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Heidelberg Heidelberg University, Department of Economics [2021]
Series:AWI discussion paper series no. 708 (December 2021)
In: AWI discussion paper series (no. 708 (December 2021))

DOI:10.11588/heidok.00031117
Subjects:
Online Access:Verlag, kostenfrei: http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/31117/7/Piazolo%26Vanberg_2021_dp708.pdf
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00031117
Resolving-System: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-311177
Langzeitarchivierung Nationalbibliothek: https://d-nb.info/124948216X/34
Verlag, kostenfrei: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/31117
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/261073
Get full text
Author Notes:David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg

MARC

LEADER 00000cam a2200000 c 4500
001 1786339536
003 DE-627
005 20240304095445.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 220118s2021 gw |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-311177  |2 urn 
024 7 |a 10.11588/heidok.00031117  |2 doi 
024 7 |a 10419/261073  |2 hdl 
035 |a (DE-627)1786339536 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1786339536 
035 |a (OCoLC)1292528567 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
044 |c XA-DE-BW 
082 0 4 |a 320  |q DE-101 
084 |a 17  |2 sdnb 
084 |a 16  |2 sdnb 
100 1 |a Piazolo, David  |d 1994-  |e VerfasserIn  |0 (DE-588)1124945059  |0 (DE-627)879262311  |0 (DE-576)48324936X  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Legislative bargaining with private information  |b a comparison of majority and unanimity rule  |c David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg 
264 1 |a Heidelberg  |b Heidelberg University, Department of Economics  |c [2021] 
300 |a 1 Online-Ressource (33 Seiten)  |b Illustrationen 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
490 1 |a AWI discussion paper series  |v no. 708 (December 2021) 
520 |a We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known "breakdown values" which determine their payoff in case of "breakdown". Breakdown occurs with some probability if the first proposal fails and with certainty if the second proposal fails. We characterize Bayesian Equilibria in Sequentially Weakly Undominated Strategies. Our central result is that responders have a signaling incentive to vote "no" on the first proposal under unanimity rule, whereas no such incentive exists under majority rule. The reason is that being perceived as a "high breakdown value type" is advantageous under unanimity rule, but disadvantageous under majority rule. As a consequence, responders are "more expensive" under unanimity rule and disagreement is more likely. These results confirm intuitions that have been stated informally before and in addition yield deeper insights into the underlying incentives and what they imply for optimal behavior in bargaining with private information. 
655 4 |0 (DE-206)34  |a Graue Literatur  |5 DE-206 
700 1 |a Vanberg, Christoph  |e VerfasserIn  |0 (DE-588)135689996  |0 (DE-627)569058562  |0 (DE-576)300588860  |4 aut 
830 0 |a AWI discussion paper series  |v no. 708 (December 2021)  |9 708  |w (DE-627)1741200679  |w (DE-600)3046500-X  |7 am 
856 4 0 |u http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/31117/7/Piazolo%26Vanberg_2021_dp708.pdf  |x Verlag  |z kostenfrei 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00031117  |v 2022-02-02  |x Resolving-System  |z kostenfrei 
856 4 0 |u https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-311177  |v 2022-02-02  |x Resolving-System 
856 4 0 |u https://d-nb.info/124948216X/34  |v 2022-02-02  |x Langzeitarchivierung Nationalbibliothek 
856 4 0 |u http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/31117  |q application/pdf  |v 2022-02-02  |x Verlag  |z kostenfrei 
856 4 0 |u http://hdl.handle.net/10419/261073  |x Resolving-System  |z kostenfrei 
951 |a BO 
992 |a 20220211 
993 |a WorkingPaper 
994 |a 2021 
998 |g 135689996  |a Vanberg, Christoph  |m 135689996:Vanberg, Christoph  |d 180000  |d 181000  |e 180000PV135689996  |e 181000PV135689996  |k 0/180000/  |k 1/180000/181000/  |p 2  |y j 
998 |g 1124945059  |a Piazolo, David  |m 1124945059:Piazolo, David  |d 180000  |d 181000  |e 180000PP1124945059  |e 181000PP1124945059  |k 0/180000/  |k 1/180000/181000/  |p 1  |x j 
999 |a KXP-PPN1786339536  |e 4055993501 
BIB |a Y 
JSO |a {"person":[{"role":"aut","display":"Piazolo, David","roleDisplay":"VerfasserIn","given":"David","family":"Piazolo"},{"roleDisplay":"VerfasserIn","display":"Vanberg, Christoph","role":"aut","family":"Vanberg","given":"Christoph"}],"name":{"displayForm":["David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg"]},"id":{"eki":["1786339536"],"doi":["10.11588/heidok.00031117"],"uri":["urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-311177"],"hdl":["10419/261073"]},"title":[{"title":"Legislative bargaining with private information","subtitle":"a comparison of majority and unanimity rule","title_sort":"Legislative bargaining with private information"}],"origin":[{"publisherPlace":"Heidelberg","dateIssuedKey":"2021","publisher":"Heidelberg University, Department of Economics","dateIssuedDisp":"[2021]"}],"recId":"1786339536","language":["eng"],"type":{"bibl":"book","media":"Online-Ressource"},"physDesc":[{"noteIll":"Illustrationen","extent":"1 Online-Ressource (33 Seiten)"}],"relMultPart":[{"dispAlt":"AWI discussion paper series","physDesc":[{"extent":"Online-Ressource"}],"id":{"eki":["1741200679"],"zdb":["3046500-X"],"hdl":["10419/127204"]},"origin":[{"publisher":"[University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics]","dateIssuedDisp":"[2020]-","publisherPlace":"[Heidelberg]"}],"name":{"displayForm":["University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics"]},"part":{"number":["no. 708 (December 2021)"],"number_sort":["708"]},"pubHistory":["No. 692 (October 2020)-"],"recId":"1741200679","language":["eng"],"corporate":[{"role":"isb","display":"Alfred-Weber-Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften","roleDisplay":"Herausgebendes Organ"}],"type":{"bibl":"serial","media":"Online-Ressource"},"disp":"AWI discussion paper series","note":["Gesehen am 20.11.23"],"title":[{"title_sort":"AWI discussion paper series","title":"AWI discussion paper series"}]}]} 
SRT |a PIAZOLODAVLEGISLATIV2021