Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanis...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Alysandratos, Theodore (Author) , Geōrganas, Sōtērēs (Author) , Sutter, Matthias (Author)
Format:	Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	Bonn, Germany IZA - Institute of Labor Economics November 2022
Series:	Discussion paper series / IZA no. 15683
In:	Discussion paper series (no. 15683)
Subjects:	Graue Literatur
Online Access:	Verlag, kostenfrei: https://docs.iza.org/dp15683.pdf Verlag, kostenfrei: https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/15683/reputation-vs-selection-effects-in-markets-with-informational-asymmetries Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/267420
Author Notes:	Theodore Alysandratos, Sotiris Georganas, Matthias Sutter