Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanis...

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Bibliographic Details

Main Authors:	Alysandratos, Theodore (Author) , Geōrganas, Sōtērēs (Author) , Sutter, Matthias (Author)
Format:	Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods November 2022
Series:	Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2022, 8
In:	Discussion papers of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods (2022, 8)
Subjects:	Graue Literatur
Online Access:	Verlag, kostenfrei: https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2022_08online.pdf Resolving-System, kostenfrei: http://hdl.handle.net/21.11116/0000-000B-6331-E Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/274057
Author Notes:	Theodore Alysandratos, Sotiris Georganas, Matthias Sutter