[Rezension von: Kosch, Michelle, Fichte’s Ethics]
Central to Kant’s moral philosophy is the compelling thought that for a rational creature to be free is to do what she has most reason to do. For Kant, it is a ‘fact of reason’ that we always have most reason to do what the moral law requires of us. Accordingly, we are free in Kant’s view insofar as...
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| Dokumenttyp: | Rezension |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
October 01, 2019
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| In: |
The philosophical review
Year: 2019, Jahrgang: 128, Heft: 4, Pages: 515-519 |
| ISSN: | 1558-1470 |
| DOI: | 10.1215/00318108-7697896 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7697896
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| Verfasserangaben: | Julia Peters |
| Zusammenfassung: | Central to Kant’s moral philosophy is the compelling thought that for a rational creature to be free is to do what she has most reason to do. For Kant, it is a ‘fact of reason’ that we always have most reason to do what the moral law requires of us. Accordingly, we are free in Kant’s view insofar as we are autonomous: that is, insofar as we determine ourselves to follow the moral law. In Fichte’s ethics, too, the freedom of rational agents plays a crucial role. Furthermore, like Kant, Fichte takes such freedom to consist in autonomy, though he typically prefers alternative terms such as ‘independence’ or ‘self-sufficiency’. However, according to Michelle Kosch’s reading of Fichte presented in Fichte’s Ethics, behind such surface similarity with Kant lies a fundamentally different moral outlook. One of the most remarkable accomplishments of Kosch’s book is that it demonstrates just how different Fichte’s moral philosophy is from Kant’s, thereby laying the groundwork for a systematic assessment of Fichte’s ethics on its own terms. |
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| Beschreibung: | Gesehen am 01.12.2022 |
| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1558-1470 |
| DOI: | 10.1215/00318108-7697896 |