Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries

In markets with asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, feedback mechanisms are important to increase market efficiency and reduce the informational disadvantage of buyers. Feedback mechanisms might work because of self-selection of more trustworthy sellers into markets with such mechanis...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Alysandratos, Theodore (Author) , Geōrganas, Sōtērēs (Author) , Sutter, Matthias (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:English
Published: Bonn ECONtribute November 2022
Series:ECONtribute discussion paper no. 205
In: ECONtribute discussion paper (no. 205)

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Online Access:Verlag, kostenfrei: https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_205_2022.pdf
Verlag, kostenfrei: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:205
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/278254
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Author Notes:Theodore Alysandratos, Sotiris Georganas, Matthias Sutter
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Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries by Alysandratos, Theodore (Author) , Geōrganas, Sōtērēs (Author) , Sutter, Matthias (Author) ,


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Reputation vs selection effects in markets with informational asymmetries by Alysandratos, Theodore (Author) , Geōrganas, Sōtērēs (Author) , Sutter, Matthias (Author) ,


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Book/Monograph Working Paper Online Resource