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Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: an experiment

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We experimentally investigate the effects of subjective claims in a multilateral bargaining game. Claims are induced by having subjects ‘produce’ the surplus to be divided by earning points in a quiz task. We use a Baron-Ferejohn framework. Our main treatment variable is the majority required to pas...

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Hauptverfasser: Merkel, Anna (VerfasserIn) , Vanberg, Christoph (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal)
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 20 January 2023
In: Journal of economic psychology
Year: 2023, Jahrgang: 95, Pages: 1-22
ISSN:0167-4870
DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2023.102601
Online-Zugang:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2023.102601
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487023000028
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Anna Merkel, Christoph Vanberg

MARC

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520 |a We experimentally investigate the effects of subjective claims in a multilateral bargaining game. Claims are induced by having subjects ‘produce’ the surplus to be divided by earning points in a quiz task. We use a Baron-Ferejohn framework. Our main treatment variable is the majority required to pass a proposal. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex combinations of the equal split and a division that is proportional to points earned in the productive task. Contrary to our predictions, this pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments in which an exogenous surplus is divided using majority rule, few subjects attempt to build minimum winning coalitions in the presence of claims from production. 
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