Multilateral bargaining with subjective claims under majority vs. unanimity rule: an experiment

We experimentally investigate the effects of subjective claims in a multilateral bargaining game. Claims are induced by having subjects ‘produce’ the surplus to be divided by earning points in a quiz task. We use a Baron-Ferejohn framework. Our main treatment variable is the majority required to pas...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Merkel, Anna (Author) , Vanberg, Christoph (Author)
Format: Article (Journal)
Language:English
Published: 20 January 2023
In: Journal of economic psychology
Year: 2023, Volume: 95, Pages: 1-22
ISSN:0167-4870
DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2023.102601
Online Access:Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2023.102601
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167487023000028
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Author Notes:Anna Merkel, Christoph Vanberg
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