Political stability and fiscal policy: time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849
This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy in a time-series analysis over 158 years at the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal commons problem of public finances is affected by the number of years a finance minister remains in office, because the incentives for an...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
9 July 2010
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| In: |
Public choice
Year: 2010, Volume: 144, Issue: 3, Pages: 505-534 |
| ISSN: | 1573-7101 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s11127-010-9677-7 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9677-7
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| Author Notes: | Lars P. Feld, Christoph A. Schaltegger |
MARC
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| 520 | |a This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy in a time-series analysis over 158 years at the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal commons problem of public finances is affected by the number of years a finance minister remains in office, because the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger. A finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office enjoys a politically powerful position towards the administration, parliament and interest groups. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister. | ||
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