Decentralized taxation and the size of government: evidence from Swiss State and local governments

According to the Leviathan Model, fiscal federalism is a binding constraint on revenue-maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism reduces public sector size, as compared to unitary states. This study uses panel data of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Feld, Lars P. (Author) , Kirchgässner, Gebhard (Author) , Schaltegger, Christoph A. (Author)
Format:	Article (Journal)
Language:	English
Published:	1 July 2010
In:	Southern economic journal Year: 2010, Volume: 77, Issue: 1, Pages: 27-48
ISSN:	2325-8012
DOI:	10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27
Online Access:	Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27
Author Notes:	Lars P. Feld, Gebhard Kirchgässner, and Christoph A. Schaltegger

Decentralized taxation and the size of government: evidence from Swiss state and local governments by Feld, Lars P. (Author) , Kirchgässner, Gebhard (Author) , Schaltegger, Christoph A. (Author) ,

in: Southern economic journal, 77 (2010), 1 vom: Juni, Seite 27-48

Article (Journal)

Decentralized taxation and the size of government: evidence from Swiss State and local governments

Decentralized taxation and the size of government: evidence from Swiss state and local governments by Feld, Lars P. (Author) , Kirchgässner, Gebhard (Author) , Schaltegger, Christoph A. (Author) ,

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