Decentralized taxation and the size of government: evidence from Swiss State and local governments
According to the Leviathan Model, fiscal federalism is a binding constraint on revenue-maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism reduces public sector size, as compared to unitary states. This study uses panel data of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Article (Journal) |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
1 July 2010
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| In: |
Southern economic journal
Year: 2010, Jahrgang: 77, Heft: 1, Pages: 27-48 |
| ISSN: | 2325-8012 |
| DOI: | 10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27 |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27 Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.4284/sej.2010.77.1.27 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Lars P. Feld, Gebhard Kirchgässner, and Christoph A. Schaltegger |