Bargaining power in the European Union: an evaluation of competing game-theoretic models
This article evaluates, by drawing on Barry's distinction between ‘power’ and ‘luck’, the predictive accuracy of competing bargaining models. We explore whether models that take various facets of political power into account predict legislative outcomes more precisely than purely preference-bas...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
February 1, 2010
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| In: |
Political studies
Year: 2010, Volume: 58, Issue: 1, Pages: 85-103 |
| ISSN: | 1467-9248 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x |
| Online Access: | Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2009.00774.x 
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| Author Notes: | Gerald Schneider, Daniel Finke, Stefanie Bailer |
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