Compliance and truthfulness: leveraging peer information with competitive audit mechanisms
How to design audit mechanisms that harness the benefits of self-reporting for achieving compliance with regulatory targets while limiting misreporting is a pressing question in many regulatory contexts, from climate policies to public health. Contrasting random audit and competitive audit mechanism...
Salvato in:
| Autori principali: | , , |
|---|---|
| Natura: | Article (Journal) |
| Lingua: | inglese |
| Pubblicazione: |
July 2023
|
| In: |
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
Year: 2023, Volume: 10, Fascicolo: 4, Pages: 947-979 |
| ISSN: | 2333-5963 |
| DOI: | 10.1086/723110 |
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | Verlag, lizenzpflichtig: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/723110 Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig: https://doi.org/10.1086/723110 
|
| Note sull'autore: | Timo Goeschl, Marcel Oestreich, Alice Soldà |
Search Result 1
Compliance and truthfulness: leveraging peer information with competitive audit mechanisms
Book/Monograph
Working Paper
Online Resource