Buchumschlag

Following social norms, signaling, and cooperation in the public goods game

In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people's cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mec...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Cui, Chi (VerfasserIn) , Dai, Ming (VerfasserIn) , Schwieren, Christiane (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Heidelberg Universität 12 Apr. 2024
Heidelberg Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg 12 Apr. 2024
Schriftenreihe:AWI discussion paper series no. 746 (April 2024)
In: AWI discussion paper series (no. 746 (April 2024))

DOI:10.11588/heidok.00034696
Schlagworte:
Graue Literatur
Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-346968
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00034696
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/34696
Verlag, kostenfrei: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/34696/3/Cui_Dai_Schwieren_dp746_2024.pdf
Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/296507
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Chi Cui, Ming Dai, and Christiane Schwieren
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people's cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mechanism, less cooperative players disguise themselves in the rule-following game, but this does not decrease cooperation overall. More importantly, the signaling mechanism has a heterogeneous effect on cooperation in rule-following and rule-breaking groups: It increases cooperation in rule-following groups but decreases cooperation in rule-breaking groups. Finally, the signaling mechanism tends to offset the decline of contributions among participants in rule-breaking groups rather than rulefollowing groups. Overall, this paper provides a feasible way to improve social cooperation and enriches the literature on cooperation in the public goods game.
Beschreibung:Online Resource
DOI:10.11588/heidok.00034696

Ähnliche Einträge