Legislative bargaining with private information: a comparison of majority and unanimity rule
We present a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. If the first period proposal fails, the game ends immediately with an exogenously given "breakdown" probab...
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| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Heidelberg
Heidelberg University, Department of Economics
27 Juli 2024
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| Series: | AWI discussion paper series
no. 753 (July 2024) |
| In: |
AWI discussion paper series (no. 753 (July 2024))
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| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00035195 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/35195/13/Piazolo_Vanberg_2024_dp753.pdf Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-351956 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00035195 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/301235 
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| Author Notes: | David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg |
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