Uncertain facts or uncertain values?: testing the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty in moral judgments

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction,...

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Hauptverfasser: Theisen, Maximilian (VerfasserIn) , Germar, Markus (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal)
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: March 2024
In: Cognitive science
Year: 2024, Jahrgang: 48, Heft: 3, Pages: 1-39
ISSN:1551-6709
DOI:10.1111/cogs.13422
Online-Zugang:Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.13422
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/cogs.13422
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Verfasserangaben:Maximilian Theisen, Markus Germar

MARC

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520 |a People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor-analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision-making, and folk metaethics. 
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