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Legislative bargaining with private information: experimental evidence comparing unanimity and majority rule

This paper experimentally investigates behavior in a legislative bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to pass a proposal. In each of two rounds, she attempts to buy the necessary votes by offering payments. Between rounds, the game ends in breakdown with a certain p...

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Hauptverfasser: Piazolo, David (VerfasserIn) , Vanberg, Christoph (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal)
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: 9 August 2025
In: Journal of economic behavior & organization
Year: 2025, Jahrgang: 237, Pages: 1-22
ISSN:1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107171
Schlagworte:
Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
Online-Zugang:Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107171
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268125002902
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:David Piazolo, Christoph Vanberg

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