Dispositionen: Segen oder Fluch für die kausale Theorie der epistemischen Stützungsbeziehung?

Many of our beliefs are based on other mental states. What does this basing relation consist in? Causal theories give the following causal condition for the belief B being based on the mental state M: (CC) M has caused B (or causes that B is maintained). The problem of deviant - causal chains shows...

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1. Verfasser: Mantel, Susanne (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal)
Sprache:Deutsch
Veröffentlicht: March 2017
In: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
Year: 2017, Jahrgang: 71, Heft: 1, Pages: 37-49
ISSN:1439-2615
DOI:10.3196/004433017820875882
Online-Zugang:Resolving-System, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.3196/004433017820875882
Verlag, lizenzpflichtig, Volltext: https://www.ingentaconnect.com/contentone/klos/zphf/2017/00000071/00000001/art00002
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Susanne Mantel
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Many of our beliefs are based on other mental states. What does this basing relation consist in? Causal theories give the following causal condition for the belief B being based on the mental state M: (CC) M has caused B (or causes that B is maintained). The problem of deviant - causal chains shows that CC is not sufficient for the basing relation. It has been proposed to solve this problem by introducing the following further dispositional condition that, together with CC, gives necessary conditions for the basing relation: (DC) B is the manifestation of a cognitive - disposition of the subject to form beliefs similar to B if it is in states similar to M. I will explore whether DC improves causal theories or, to the contrary, weakens those theories. Although DC excludes deviant causal chains successfully it casts doubts on whether CC is a necessary - condition. As soon as DC is accepted, everything speaks in favor of abandoning CC. Thus, the attempt to improve causal theories by introducing a dispositional condition unintentionally challenges the causal approach and indicates that a purely dispositional theory is to be preferred.
Beschreibung:Online veröffentlicht: 1. März 2017
Gesehen am 23.12.2025
Beschreibung:Online Resource
ISSN:1439-2615
DOI:10.3196/004433017820875882