Thick concepts and moral revisionism in Plato’s Gorgias: arguing about something there can be no argument about
Abstract David Furley has suggested that we think of Callicles’ immoralism as attacking a thick concept. I take up this suggestion and apply it to the argument of Plato’s Gorgias more generally. I show that the discussion between Socrates, Gorgias and Polus, which prepares the ground for Callicles,...
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| Format: | Article (Journal) |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
08 Nov 2019
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| In: |
Phronesis
Year: 2019, Volume: 65, Issue: 2, Pages: 153-178 |
| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| DOI: | 10.1163/15685284-12342018 |
| Online Access: | Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12342018 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://brill.com/view/journals/phro/65/2/article-p153_2.xml 
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| Author Notes: | Philipp Brüllmann |
| Summary: | Abstract David Furley has suggested that we think of Callicles’ immoralism as attacking a thick concept. I take up this suggestion and apply it to the argument of Plato’s Gorgias more generally. I show that the discussion between Socrates, Gorgias and Polus, which prepares the ground for Callicles, is precisely addressing the thickness of the concept of justice: it reveals that this concept is both descriptive and evaluative and that formulating a revisionist position about justice is therefore extremely difficult. Callicles’ strategy is best read as a response to this difficulty, which sets the stage for Socrates’ revisionist account of justice. |
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| Item Description: | Gesehen am 11.02.2026 |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| ISSN: | 1568-5284 |
| DOI: | 10.1163/15685284-12342018 |