Solving dilemma games with evolving conditional commitments
I study a formal mechanism that can sustain Pareto optimality in a new and very broad class of dilemma games. In the absence of a central authority that could enforce multilateral agreements, the mechanism is based on binding unilateral commitments, which condition a playerís (possibly multidimensi...
Gespeichert in:
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| Dokumenttyp: | Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Heidelberg
Heidelberg University, Department of Economics
2. Februar 2026
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| Schriftenreihe: | AWI discussion paper series
no. 770 (January 2026) |
| In: |
AWI discussion paper series (no. 770 (January 2026))
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| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00038034 |
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| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, kostenfrei: https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/38034/7/Oechssler_Solving_dp770_2026.pdf Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-380343 Resolving-System, kostenfrei: https://doi.org/10.11588/heidok.00038034 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Jörg Oechssler |
| Zusammenfassung: | I study a formal mechanism that can sustain Pareto optimality in a new and very broad class of dilemma games. In the absence of a central authority that could enforce multilateral agreements, the mechanism is based on binding unilateral commitments, which condition a playerís (possibly multidimensional) contribution on other playersí contributions. I show that unexploitable better response dynamics converge to Pareto optimal contributions when the game is played recurrently. |
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| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| DOI: | 10.11588/heidok.00038034 |