Ethical decision-making under empirical and moral uncertainty

This study compares the role of empirical and moral uncertainty in ethical decision-making. Empirical uncertainty refers to uncertainty about non-normative empirical states, such as the outcome of an action. Moral uncertainty refers to uncertainty about moral principles, such as whether a deontologi...

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Hauptverfasser: Theisen, Maximilian (VerfasserIn) , Germar, Markus (VerfasserIn) , Funke, Joachim (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Article (Journal) Kapitel/Artikel
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: November 16, 2020
In: Open Science Framework
Year: 2020, Pages: 1-19
DOI:10.17605/OSF.IO/STHVJ
Online-Zugang:Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/STHVJ
Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: https://osf.io/sthvj/
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Verfasserangaben:Maximilian Theisen, Markus Germar, Joachim Funke
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:This study compares the role of empirical and moral uncertainty in ethical decision-making. Empirical uncertainty refers to uncertainty about non-normative empirical states, such as the outcome of an action. Moral uncertainty refers to uncertainty about moral principles, such as whether a deontological or consequentialist reasoning should be applied in a given situation. Following the meta-ethical literature on moral uncertainty, we propose that decisions under moral uncertainty can be described by applying a form of expected-value reasoning. According to this approach, the product of both the credence a person has in a moral position and the moral value this moral position would ascribe to the given action, summed over all moral positions, predicts the moral judgment of the respective action. - We are running an online study with 200 undergraduate students to compare the influence of empirical uncertainty on a purely consequentialist evaluation to the influence of moral uncertainty on a personal evaluation that might include both consequentialist and deontological reasons.
Beschreibung:Gesehen am 26.02.2026
Beschreibung:Online Resource
DOI:10.17605/OSF.IO/STHVJ