Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils
This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' ; preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central ban...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Frankfurt am Main
Dt. Bundesbank
2001
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| Series: | Discussion paper / Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank
2001,3 |
| In: |
Discussion paper (2001,3)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Inhaltsverzeichnis, Inhaltsverzeichnis: http://www.gbv.de/dms/hbz/toc/ht012943950.pdf
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| Author Notes: | Hans Gersbach; Volker Hahn |
| Summary: | This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' ; preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central bankers take into account the fact that they might not be re-elected. Thus, the publication of voting records is beneficial since the government can distinguish central bankers' ; in terms of their preferences and can align the central bank council's preferences with those of the general public over time by means of its re-election decisions. |
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| Item Description: | Zsfassung in dt. Sprache. - Literaturverz. S. 15 - 16 |
| ISBN: | 3933747678 |