Voting transparency and conflicting interests in central bank councils

This paper examines whether it is socially desirable for the individual voting records of central bank council members to be published when central bankers' ; preferences differ. We show that the misrepresentation of their preferences is not advantageous for central bankers although central ban...

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Détails bibliographiques

Auteurs principaux:	Gersbach, Hans (Auteur) , Hahn, Volker (Auteur)
Format:	Book/Monograph Working Paper
Langue:	anglais
Publié:	Frankfurt am Main Dt. Bundesbank 2001
Collection:	Discussion paper / Economic Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank 2001,3
In:	Discussion paper (2001,3)
Sujets:	Arbeitspapier Graue Literatur Publizitätspflicht Abstimmung Beschlussfassung Notenbank
Accès en ligne:	Verlag, Inhaltsverzeichnis, Inhaltsverzeichnis: http://www.gbv.de/dms/hbz/toc/ht012943950.pdf Inhaltsverzeichnis: http://scans.hebis.de/HEBCGI/show.pl?09634058_toc.pdf
Notes sur l'auteur:	Hans Gersbach; Volker Hahn