Cake division by majority decision
We consider a collective choice process where three players make proposals sequentially on how to divide a given quantity of resources. Afterwards, one of the proposals is chosen by majority decision. If no proposal obtains a majority, a proposal is drawn by lot. We establish the existence of the se...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Dokumenttyp: | Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.]
2006
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Public choice
1872 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (1872)
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: |
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| Verfasserangaben: | Hans Gersbach; Bernhard Pachl |
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