Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Hauptverfasser:	Aaken, Anne van (VerfasserIn) , Feld, Lars P. (VerfasserIn) , Voigt, Stefan (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp:	Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies [u.a.] 2008
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series Public choice 2245
In:	CESifo working papers (2245)
Schlagworte:	1998-2006 Verfolgung Korruption Politiker
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Verfasserangaben:	Anne van Aaken; Lars P. Feld; Stefan Voigt