Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?
Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium provides good predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however, actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attribute the robust deviations...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Article (Journal) Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Heidelberg
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
May 27, 2008
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| Ausgabe: | This version: May 27, 2008 |
| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics
no. 469 |
| In: |
Discussion paper series (no. 469)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127283 Verlag, Volltext: http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/Discussion%20papers/papers/dp469.pdf 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey |
| Zusammenfassung: | Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium provides good predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however, actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attribute the robust deviations from Nash equilibrium to actual players’ considering not only marginal gains and losses but also total pay-offs. In this paper, we show that optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards strategic ambiguity may induce such behaviour. |
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| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| Dokumenttyp: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |