Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator

It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser: Aaken, Anne van (VerfasserIn) , Feld, Lars P. (VerfasserIn) , Voigt, Stefan (VerfasserIn)
Dokumenttyp: Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Marburg Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics 2008
Schriftenreihe:Joint discussion paper series in economics 2008,01
In: Joint discussion paper series in economics (2008,01)

Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Verlag, Volltext: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/01-2008_voigt.pdf
Download aus dem Internet, Stand 07.08.2009, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30097
Volltext
Verfasserangaben:Anne van Aaken; Lars P. Feld; Stefan Voigt

MARC

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