Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
It is hypothesized that prosecution agencies that are dependent on the executive have less incentives to prosecute crimes committed by government members which, in turn, increases their incentives to commit such crimes. Here, this hypothesis is put to an empirical test focusing on a particular kind...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Dokumenttyp: | Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Marburg
Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics
2008
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| Schriftenreihe: | Joint discussion paper series in economics
2008,01 |
| In: |
Joint discussion paper series in economics (2008,01)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, Volltext: http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/01-2008_voigt.pdf Download aus dem Internet, Stand 07.08.2009, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30097 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Anne van Aaken; Lars P. Feld; Stefan Voigt |
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Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
Book/Monograph
Arbeitspapier
Online Resource
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Power over prosecutors corrupts politicians: cross country evidence using a new indicator
Book/Monograph
Arbeitspapier