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A dynamic Ellsberg urn experiment

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Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Dominiak, Adam (Author) , Dürsch, Peter (Author) , Lefort, Jean-Philippe (Author)
Format: Book/Monograph Working Paper
Language:German
English
Published: Heidelberg Universitätsbibliothek der Universität Heidelberg September 2009
Heidelberg University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics September 2009
Series:Discussion paper series / Universität Heidelberg, Department of Economics no. 487
In: Discussion paper series (no. 487)

Subjects:
Graue Literatur
Online Access:Resolving-System, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-opus-98286
Verlag, Volltext: http://www.awi.uni-heidelberg.de/with2/Discussion%20papers/papers/dp487.pdf
Resolving-System, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127306
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Author Notes:Adam Dominiak, Peter Dürsch, and Jean-Philippe Lefort
Description
Summary:Two rationality arguments are used to justify the link between conditional and unconditional preferences in decision theory: dynamic consistency and consequentialism. Dynamic consistency requires that ex ante contingent choices are respected by updated preferences. Consequentialism states that only those outcomes which are still possible can matter for updated preferences. We test the descriptive validity of these rationality arguments with a dynamic version of Ellsberg's three color experiment and find that subjects act more often in line with consequentialism than with dynamic consistency.
Item Description:Online publiziert: 2009
Physical Description:Online Resource
Format:Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader.

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