Mandatory sick pay provision: a labor market experiment
The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention in an experimental labor market that is rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions to occur. We find that higher si...
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| Other Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article (Journal) Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Jena
Univ. [u.a.]
2009
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| Series: | Jena economics research papers
2009,076 |
| In: |
Jena economics research papers (2009,076)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Volltext: http://zs.thulb.uni-jena.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/jportal_derivate_00175396/wp_2009_076.pdf Download aus dem Internet, Stand: 07.10.2009, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32558 
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| Author Notes: | Stefan Bauernschuster; Peter Duersch; Jörg Oechssler; Radovan Vadovic |
| Summary: | The question whether a minimum rate of sick pay should be mandated is much debated. We study the effects of this kind of intervention in an experimental labor market that is rich enough to allow for moral hazard, adverse selection, and crowding out of good intentions to occur. We find that higher sick pay is reciprocated by workers through higher effort but only if sick pay is not mandated. We also study adverse selection effects when workers have different probabilities of getting sick and can reject the hypothesis that this leads to market breakdown. Overall, we find that mandating sick pay actually leads to a higher voluntary provision of sick pay by firms. -- sick pay ; sick leave ;experiment ; gift exchange. |
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| Item Description: | Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen |
| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |