Political stability and fiscal policy time series evidence for the Swiss federal level since 1849
This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series analysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbe...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Buch/Monographie Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies
2009
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| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Public finance
2691 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (2691)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: |
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| Verfasserangaben: | Lars P. Feld ; Christoph A. Schaltegger |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper explores the role of political stability on fiscal policy choices in a time-series analysis over 158 years on the Swiss federal level. We argue that the fiscal-commons problem of public finances is affected by the time-horizon of a finance minister. Arguably, the incentives for an incumbent to maintain a good reputation with sound policy decisions are stronger the longer the time-horizon of a respective term. In addition, a finance minister who succeeds to stay a long time in office normally enjoys a politically powerful position towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups to influence policy decisions. In contrast, frequent government turnover weakens the position of the finance minister. |
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| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 27 - 30 |