Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF conditionality?
We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Göttingen
CeGE
2010
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| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion papers / CeGE
104 |
| In: |
Cege discussion paper (104)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Download aus dem Internet, Stand 02.07.2010, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41574 Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://webdoc.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/lm/CEGE/104.pdf Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://wwwuser.gwdg.de/~lstohr/cege/Diskussionspapiere/104_dreher.pdf 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Axel Dreher; Jan-Egbert Sturm; James Raymond Vreeland |
| Zusammenfassung: | We investigate whether elected members of the United Nations Security Council receive favorable treatment from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), analyzing panel data on the level of conditionality attached to (a maximum of) 314 IMF arrangements with 101 countries over the period of 1992 to 2008. We find a negative relationship: Security Council members receive about 30 percent fewer conditions attached to the loans that they receive from the IMF. We conclude that conditionality is softer for these countries because the major shareholders of the IMF desire influence over the Security Council. -- IMF ; UN Security Council ; Voting ; Aid ; Conditionality |
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| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| Dokumenttyp: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |