Buying votes and international organizations
This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Deutsch Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Göttingen
CeGE
2011
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| Schriftenreihe: | Discussion papers / Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research
123 |
| In: |
Cege discussion paper (123)
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Verlag, Volltext: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/document/download/214cccc38fca799be617db86370ef608.pdf/123_Dreher.pdf Verlag, kostenfrei, Volltext: http://webdoc.gwdg.de/ebook/serien/lm/CEGE/123.pdf Download aus dem Internet, Stand 06.06.2011, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70233 
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| Verfasserangaben: | Axel Dreher; James Raymond Vreeland |
| Zusammenfassung: | This study explores a basic idea in political economy: Trading money for political influence. Our focus is at the level of international institutions, where governments may exploit their influence in one organization to gain leverage over another. In particular, we consider the lending activities of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and voting behavior at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Analyzing an original dataset on the successful and failed resolutions of the UNSC, we find evidence of vote-buying. -- IMF ; UN Security Council ; Voting ; Aid |
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| Beschreibung: | Online Resource |
| Dokumenttyp: | Acrobat Reader. Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |