Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies
We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries be...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Book/Monograph Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
München
CESifo
2013
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| Series: | CESifo working paper Public Choice
4382 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (4382)
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Verlag, Volltext: http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19096190 Download aus dem Internet, Stand: 16.09.2013, Volltext: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/84165 
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| Author Notes: | Lars P. Feld; Jan Schnellenbach |
| Summary: | We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort. |
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| Physical Description: | Online Resource |
| Format: | Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader. |