Political institutions and income (re-)distribution: evidence from developed economies
We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries be...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Dokumenttyp: | Book/Monograph Arbeitspapier |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies
2013
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| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Public choice
4382 |
| In: |
CESifo working papers (4382)
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| Online-Zugang: |
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| Verfasserangaben: | Lars P. Feld ; Jan Schnellenbach |
| Zusammenfassung: | We discuss the effect of formal political institutions (electoral systems, fiscal decentralization, presidential and parliamentary regimes) on the extent and direction of income (re-) distribution. Empirical evidence is presented for a large sample of 70 economies and a panel of 13 OECD countries between 1981 and 1998. The evidence indicates that presidential regimes are associated with a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, while electoral systems have no significant effects. Fiscal competition is associated with less income redistribution and a less equal distribution of disposable incomes, but also with a more equal primary income distribution. Our evidence also is in line with earlier empirical contributions that find a positive relationship between trade openness and equality in primary and disposable incomes, as well as the overall redistributive effort. |
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| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 22 - 23 |